31st March 2006 Stumble it!

Methodological Naturalism is not like Baseball

posted in Creationism, Science by themaiden |

Paul Nelson has a well written article up at IDtheFuture, “Ron Numbers, Methodological Naturalism, and the Rules of Baseball”. He is engaging and readable, and, I think, sincere, but the article rests upon one basic, and flawed, idea, summarized best in the last few paragraphs of the article.

Not a word from Howard Stein about the necessity of methodological naturalism. Russell’s “comparatively detailed considerations” were evidential, not in-principle, and naturalism as a provisional epistemology would work only if evidence, not metaphysics, were running the show.

Because naturalism — the ultimate causal sufficiency of autonomous physical laws — might be false. The best way to discover its actual strength, therefore, is not to assume naturalism’s truth without challenge, but to let other contenders into the field of play. Ordinary testability is more than enough as a ground rule for science.

Unless one wants to win, no matter what the evidence. In that case, make methodological naturalism an in-principle stricture on scientific reasoning.

Rig the game, in other words.

Intelligent Design the Future: Ron Numbers, Methodological Naturalism, and the Rules of Baseball

Rig the game? Like most who complain about methodological naturalism, Nelson misrepresents, or perhaps does not himself understand, its logical underpinnings. Its lines were not drawn arbitrarily. It is not like baseball and changing the rules does not mean that one simply plays a different game. In a very real sense, changing the rules means that there is no game to play. That is, changing the rules leads to a game where it is impossible to sort the winners from the losers, where it is impossible to sort fact from fiction. Really, he is making the same mistake made by Alvin Plantinga in a recent article, so I guess there is consolation in the company.

I’ve addressed the subject many time in the past so I am quoting myself here, with emphasis added.

What does that mean? Well, science is based upon the idea that we mere humans answer questions about nature by appeal to other things in nature. That is, we answer questions by appeal to our senses. By asking scientists to remove the ‘naturalistic bias’ the creationists are asking scientists to allow answers that appeal to things we CAN NOT see, hear, smell, touch, taste or in any other wise detect. Now, the creationists of course need this concession if their theories involving God are going to even be allowed in the door, and at first quick glance it seems a bit unfair to rule things out at the onset. But it only takes a few seconds reflection to realize the problem.

If we remove the ‘naturalistic bias’—the insistence that elements of our theory be detectable in some way—then anything I make up stands on equal footing with anything you or anyone else makes up. There is no way at all to test the various ideas. It is the final stop on the truth-is-relative train ride. Everyone believes what they want. Truth becomes meaningless. This consequence can’t really be avoided.

ID and deeper issues indeed

What does it mean that scientists have a naturalistic bias?

What scientists do is attempt to explain the world in terms of things which humans can see, hear, taste, touch, or smell, via some means biological or technological. In its simplistic incarnation this is what every parent teaches his or her child as that child grows up. “What you make up is not real.” If your child is afraid of a monster under the bed, you tell the child to look and see if the monster is there. You are, in effect, teaching that child the same naturalistic bias that ‘plagues’ science.

In other words, science is biased toward things, explanations, for which we have evidence and against explanations for which there is no possible way we can have evidence—that is, against explanations, or components of explanations, we cannot see, feel, taste, hear, or smell. Remove this restriction, remove this ‘naturalistic’ bias, and anything that anyone can imagine becomes a viable explanation Why does the sun burn? Zeus has bad gas and Hera lights his farts to get even with him for that shape-shifting philandering. Without recourse to something tangible, without forcing the teller of the tale to provide physical evidence, that is a perfectly fine explanation It is only those with a ‘naturalistic’ bias that can’t see the truth of Zeus’ gastrointestinal problems.

Is evolution as scientific as the Earth revolving around the sun?

There are really only two options. On the one hand, one can base reasoning upon things that can be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelled. That option is called empiricism. Empiricism provides one with a means by which to check answers. Arguments can be settled by simply looking for evidence. On the other hand, one has any of several approaches to knowledge which do not require that evidence be of the kind that can be seen, heard, touched, tasted, or smelled. That is, in these other approaches, evidence is not required at all. The result is a situation where any flight of imagination is on par with any other flight of imagination, and there is no way to sort out differences. To what can one appeal for clarification if not the tangible? To a prophet? How does one sort the true prophet from the sham if not by tangible evidence? To a holy book? How does one sort the good book from the bad? This is the philosophical question upon which science rests, “Do we want to base our knowledge upon evidence, or not?” By not properly explaining the ‘philosophical question’ Wieseltier leaves the impression that science is one of several equally reasonable approaches to knowledge. It really isn’t. Science is the one hand that requires evidence; other approaches are evidence-less, and lacking evidence, are eternally divorced from any meaningful conception of ‘true’ or ‘false’. Anything goes in those worlds. Wieselter does not mention this consequence of abandoning science’s ‘philosophical’ bent.

Science is religion; therefore, religion is science.

Now, as a six year old I invoked an unseen entity—the thing under the bed—and refused to go to sleep. I was told, by my devout parents, to look under the bed. I looked. They looked. They told me, apparently not realizing the implications for their faith, that if I couldn’t see it or hear it or touch it, then it isn’t there and can’t hurt me. The theory of evolution, like all of science, is an attempt to explain things that we can see, touch, taste, hear, or smell in terms of things we can see, touch, hear, taste or smell. There is a world of difference between the two. Granted, science does insist upon tangible evidence, evidence that can be seen, felt, heard, tasted, or smelled, but there is a reason for this. People realized centuries ago that only tangibles can be verified. Everything else is subject to whim. Intangibles, in other words, are all created equal. What I imagine is equal to what anyone else imagines so long as they are both intangible. Zeus is equal to Kali. Kali is equal to Allah. Allah is equal to Christ. And Christ is equal to talking gnomes that only I can perceive, and there is no way to sort out the mess. There is nothing to serve as arbiter. There is no evidence upon which a person can call. Intangibles do not leave evidence. This insistence upon evidence is not, therefore, a doctrine as Rosenblum claims but it is the only option for rational thought, the only option that allows for rational thought. Remove the condition for evidence and humanity is trapped in make-believe.

Charlie Darwin’s angels… er, clever

PZ Myers, at Pharyngula, has alsoaddresses similar issues in Nelson’s post, and the comments are well worth reading as well. Of special note is a comment which reminded me of something I nearly forgot to mention.

We need to be careful in explaining science to point out that it makes no assumptions about the nature of nature. Science does not have some preliminary rule that leaves gods and ghosts and things that go bump in the night out of its domain. Science goes wherever empirical investigation takes it. If there is something that leaves no evidence of its existence, that is not science’s fault. The gods are shy about revealing themselves. Or rather, their believers go to great lengths to imagine the gods are this way, since the gaps get ever smaller.

Posted by: Russell

This is an important point. Science, or methodological naturalism even, does not rule out things like gods. What is does rule out is intangibles. Intangibles are meaningless. Provide some tangible evidence for gods or for a God, and science will be right there with you.

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There are currently 9 responses to “Methodological Naturalism is not like Baseball”

Why not let us know what you think by adding your own comment! Your opinion is as valid as anyone elses, so come on... let us know what you think.

  1. 1 On April 1st, 2006, Corkscrew said:

    Problem is, there’s two definitions of methodological naturalism that keep getting conflated. One is the one you mentioned: “thou shalt not invoke causes about which predictions cannot be made”. That one’s tied into the basic fabric of science.

    The other one is the one that non-scientists tend to think of when they come across the term: “thou shalt not invoke gods, ghosts, psychic powers or other noncorporeal entities”. That one’s merely an extremely successful guideline, and as such is subject to revision as and when someone comes up with a predictive model of poltergeist activity.

    It’s vitally important to distinguish the two, otherwise casual listeners will tend to get confused.

  2. 2 On May 13th, 2006, hell’s handmaiden » Blog Archive » Yet another person gets it wrong said:

    [...] Uncommon Descent quotes to the article, the transcript of a speach perhaps, and that is how I found it, but the error is John H. Calvert, Esq.’s. He, like Plantinga, Paul Nelson others, re-frames methodological naturalism as a bias, even a faith, rather than as a necessary consequence of thinking straight. Currently many institutions of science do not seek an inference to the best current explanation about the origin of life and its diversity. Instead they actually abandon the scientific method and prejudge the question by allowing only one of two competing explanations. The permitted explanation is that life is the product of only material causes. A material cause is a cause attributable to the physical and chemical properties of matter, energy and the forces. Although material causes adequately explain most physical systems like rocks, rivers, wind and rain, a growing number of scientists believe material causes are not adequate to explain the observed fine-tuning of the universe, the origin of life and much of its diversity. [...]

  3. 3 On August 14th, 2006, David said:

    Ah, maiden, you make mistakes here that as bad as Paul Nelson’s, I think.

    First, you don’t really understand Nelson’s mistake. He made a mistake with terminology. He isn’t really complaining about methodology at all. He’s complaining about the introduction of philosophical naturalism (materialism) into the natural sciences: every observation is given a materialistic interpretation.

    Second, science is not empirical in the way you use the word. The original meaning of the word “empirical” is “experiential”: deriving from experience. Science is empirical in this sense as is all knowledge. Science does not depend solely on the physical senses. (It is not the mere sight or touch of a chair that tells you it is a chair is it?)

    In connection to your false statement that science deals with things via the physical senses you say that science “answer[s] questions about nature by appeal to other things in nature.” Would you include physicists use of mathematical entities like numbers in this?

  4. 4 On August 14th, 2006, themaiden said:

    David,

    Whatever mistake in terminology Nelson may have made, this article addresses his complaint about naturalism in science.

    Science is empirical in exactly the way that I use the term. It is based in experience, and that means it is based in physical sense data, for the reasons I have given. We humans abstract, extrapolate, group, and describe but it is all based in sense data. Science is one option. The other option is the acceptance of complete fantasy.

    Touching a chair doesn’t tell me it is a chair. ‘Chair’ is a label. Touching a chair tells me it hard, feels like wood, etc. My brain tells me that this collection of sensations matches what I’ve come to understand to be a chair.

    Math is a description. It is a descriptive language ultimately derived from observations of the world. (I address this in C.S. Lewis, Instinct, and the Moral Law.) What is the problem?

  5. 5 On August 14th, 2006, David said:

    The problem, oh mighty handmaiden of hell, is that I am a web surfer who has a keen interest in both natural science and philosophy who did not think (and still doesn’t) you were fair to the complaint Nelson made in the essay you quoted.

    The ‘naturalistic bias’ he complained about is not an insistence that “elements of [scientific hypotheses and theories] be detectable in some way.” It is — as he explicitly stated — the philosophical assumption of “ultimate causal sufficiency of autonomous physical laws” for the forming of living organisms. (Contrary to the assertions of Pharyngula poster Russell, scientists allow philosphical assumptions to influence them all the time.)

    Design or intention (conscious or unconcious) in nature is something that will be perfectly observable if present. There is nothing about laws that operate only in living organisms and not in inanimate matter that should make them beyond obersvation either. But, as Husserl realized, what is observed cannot be separated from the way of observing.

    As I just hinted with the above sentence, I am not currently satisfied with your demonstrated grasp of the philosophy of science. I should admit that this is a fairly forgivable flaw as most scientists have no grasp of the philosophy of science. But then how many scientists, in discussing a critique of scientific practices, would have written “Zeus is equal to Kali. Kali is equal to Allah. Allah is equal to Christ. And Christ is equal to talking gnomes”?

    My second complaint was about your going on and on and on about seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelling. While it is true that we would not know about the natural world outside ourselves without our physical senses, these senses are not sufficient to give us scientific level knowlege of it (knowledge of its intrinsic intelligibility). For that additional experience of a non-sensory kind is always going to be needed.

    For example, our eyes can tell us that most plants are green. But that knowledge is hardly scientific. The recognition that plants feed on sunlight is of a scientific level — but that can only be seen by the mind, not by the eyes.

    While I’m on this I should mention something I didn’t in my first post. You said that the natural sciences have to deal only with the tangible because only the tangible can be verified. This isn’t true at all. The wavefunction of a physical system is perfectly intangible and perfectly verifiable.

    Mathematics is used in a descriptive way by physicists, but it is not just a descriptive language. It is a language, yes, but that isn’t surprising. As Gadamer says, “Being which is intelligible is language.” I asked about the use of numbers and other mathematical entities by scientists because I wanted to learn about your views on the ontological status of them vis-a-vis the things scientists describe by using them.

  6. 6 On February 18th, 2007, hell’s handmaiden » Blog Archive » Evolution News & Buckley Misses the Point too said:

    [...] Methodological Naturalism is not like Baseball [...]

  7. 7 On March 10th, 2007, hell’s handmaiden » Blog Archive » A curious argument said:

    [...] O’Leary rambles around the concept of materialism in order to attempt her case. Like most creationists, she makes a big mess of things mostly because she fails to understand that what she is talking about isn’t materialism exactly, but empiricism or methodological naturalism. And what naturalism is, is the idea that we base our reasons upon evidence that we can actually acquire. We can only only acquire evidence via our senses, and of course, via whatever means we can devise to augment those senses– such as teloscopes. I’ve written considerably about this issue already, particularly in Alvin Plantinga… hmm, never really liked Plantinga and in Methodological Naturalism is not like Baseball. I don’t intend to rehash those posts. I have a different point to make. [...]

  8. 8 On March 17th, 2007, hell’s handmaiden » Blog Archive » The Raw Story Whackjob said:

    [...] I’ve written too much on methodological naturalism lately to dig into it again now. I suggest reading the latter half of my criticism of one of Alvin Plantinga’s essays, and my response to Paul Nelson on the topic of baseball. [...]

  9. 9 On May 31st, 2007, The Raw Story Whackjob | hell's handmaiden said:

    [...] I suggest reading the latter half of my criticism of one of Alvin Plantinga’s essays, and my response to Paul Nelson on the topic of [...]

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